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Abstract 
This paper examines the effect of local religiosity on employee treatment, proxied by workplace 
safety incidents. Using the establishment-level data compiling on the incidents of work-related 
injuries, we find that employees of the establishments in more religious counties get less injured 
than those in less religious counties. We further find that a reduction in occupational accidents is 
more evident for establishments in counties dominated by one religious denomination, 
strengthening our argument on community solidarity and homophily stemming from religious 
networks. Firms whose establishments are located in high religiosity counties are less likely to 
violate workplace conduct and more likely to take workplace safety measures. Moreover, firms 
with more work-related injuries exhibit poorer firm performance. Overall, our findings suggest 
that local religiosity has a value implication through human capital protection. 
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Given the importance of human capital, employee treatment encompasses employees’ 
knowledge, skills, and other features that can be converted into productivity. Especially, Zingales 
(2000) highlights the greater importance of human capital in “new” firms1 which are distinct from 
capital-centered “traditional” firms. Although numerous papers have documented the effects of 
employee treatment (e.g., Edmans (2011), Chen et al. (2011), and Au et al. (2019)), the determinant 
of employee treatment has not been clearly uncovered yet. Hence, the purpose of this study is to 
address this knowledge breach. Notably, by focusing on the cultural trait of an establishment’s 
local area, we empirically explore if local religiosity is associated with employee treatment as 
measured by cross-regional variations in degrees of workplace safety in the U.S. 
Departing from prior research on employee treatment using intangible measures such as 
employee satisfaction (e.g., Edmans (2011)), we choose to exploit more tangible events, 
occupational accidents, which present an advantage over other measures such as employee 
satisfaction because easily traceable records allow us to gauge employee treatment more 
objectively and unambiguously. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 5,250 American 
workers died from work-related injuries in 20182. The National Safety Council also estimates that 
income loss due to preventable work-related injuries is close to $161.5 billion in 20173. Moreover, 
in addition to substantial economic and societal loss, workplace safety issues have a nontrivial 
negative impact on firm value (see Cohn and Wardlaw (2016)) through a reduction in productivity, 
an increase in compensation claims (e.g., medical expenses), and workplace morale. Therefore, 
 
1 He further argues that employee skills become less specialized fitting to specific firms, and employees have 
better outside opportunities than before as the global market becomes integrated.   
2 See at https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cfoi.pdf 
3 See at https://injuryfacts.nsc.org/work/costs/work-injury-costs/ 
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understanding key factors in occupational safety is one of the uppermost issues for typical business 
owners.  
We posit that religiosity could influence workplace safety, either positively or negatively. 
On the one hand, several papers have shown that religiosity is positively associated with individual 
and corporate risk-taking behavior and thus has substantial economic implications. For example, 
Kumar (2009) and Kumar et al. (2011) find that religions, especially Catholics, have implications 
regarding peoples’ gambling tolerance and their propensity to choose lottery-type investments. 
Additionally, Adhikari and Agrawal (2016) show that local culture as shown by religion is related 
to firms’ innovative endeavors, which tend to have risky and positively-skewed payoff 
distributions. If this risk-based aspect of religiosity affects workplace safety, we would expect 
more workplace accidents in areas with high religiosity, especially where Catholics are dominant. 
On the other hand, numerous studies present the basis for the impact of social interaction 
and trust on diverse aspects of a firm, such as product innovation and workplace performance (e.g., 
Guiso et al. (2015); Lins et al. (2017)). Concurrently, several studies have also documented that 
religiosity significantly affects how people behave and interact in society. In particular, studies 
(e.g., McPherson et al. (2001)) have shown religion as one of the most outstanding personal traits 
to form homophily, the tendency for similar people to be connected at a higher rate than dissimilar 
ones, with robust implications for how people form their societal attitudes and experience 
interactions. Also, religious people are more trusting of other people and more authentic (e.g., 
Guiso et al. (2003)). Focusing on these aspects of religiosity, we use local religiosity to identify 
community members’ propensity for social networking, interaction, trust, and solidarity. If this 
aspect of religiosity in terms of homophily, social network, and trust is an influential factor in the 
workplace, we anticipate that higher religiosity will be associated with better workplace safety, 
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attributable to social network solidarity and stronger trust among community members in more 
religious areas. To carry out our empirical tests, we obtain work-related injury and illness data 
from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and construct (unbalanced) 
panel data of occupational injuries and illnesses at the establishment level. More specifically, 
throughout the paper, our primary measure of workplace safety is the sum of deaths and all injuries 
and illnesses that result in days away from work or with job restrictions or transfers, and other 
recordable cases at the establishment in a given year. In this study, we find strong evidence that 
employees of the establishments in more religious counties get less injured than those in less 
religious counties. Moreover, the size of the relation between religiosity and workplace safety is 
economically substantial as well. In our regression analysis, one standard deviation increase in the 
level of local religiosity corresponds to a 1.5% drop in the number of work-related injury cases, 
even after controlling for corporate and demographic characteristics.  
The common weakness of studies examining the effect of local religiosity on economic 
outcomes is the confounding effect, which refers to local religiosity being highly correlated with 
observable (e.g., age, gender, and education) and/or unobservable characteristics (e.g., personal 
mentality and family tradition) of local communities. To address this endogeneity issue, we present 
that our evidence is robust to a battery of sensitivity tests, including the alternative definition of 
religiosity, a two-stage model with an instrumental variable, a difference-in-differences approach 
exploiting migration shock, and other various approaches to deal with endogeneity.  
We further demonstrate that the positive effect of religiosity on workplace safety4 is little 
explained by the risk-based aspect of religion for three reasons: 1) we find similar evidence with 
the baseline result after controlling for known proxy variables related to risk-taking such as the 
 
4 The negative relation between religiosity and work-related injuries and illnesses symbolizes the positive 
relation between local religiosity and workplace safety. 
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state-level lottery consumption, 2) our baseline result holds when we employ a residual religion 
variable orthogonal to several relevant characteristics including local risk attitudes, and 3) the 
effect of religiosity on workplace safety is indifferent between high and low Catholic areas. We 
rather find that workplace safety is better in areas dominated by one religious denomination, 
regardless of whether it is Protestant or Catholic5. Therefore, the correlation between workplace 
safety and local religiosity is less likely driven by the manner of risk-taking behavior documented 
in prior studies (e.g., Chen et al. (2014)), but rather, it is more likely determined by the degree of 
unity among community members sharing the same religious identity. The effect of this unity 
among community members sharing the same religious identity survives even after controlling for 
other social networks, such as social capital (network through non-religious social institutions), 
risk-related traits, local ethnicity, and other minority groups within the local religiosity. This 
finding is consistent with the empirical evidence that employee behaviors and performance in the 
workplace are positively affected by cooperative relationships and mutual trust within 
organizations (e.g., Kim et al. (2018)). Mencl and May (2009) also show that employees refrain 
from workplace misbehavior when they are socially and psychologically close to colleagues at 
work. Such tendencies could be more evident when community solidarity is built-in secure social 
networks and trust formed through sharing the same religious beliefs.  
We provide two additional tests within the context of the mechanisms through which local 
religiosity affects workplace safety. We find that establishments in more religious counties are 
remarkably linked with better workplace safety when the parent firm has lower discretionary 
 
5 In the U.S., Protestants and Catholics are two major religions: about 43% and 20% of Americans identify 
themselves as Protestants and Catholics in 2019, respectively. About 26% of Americans are not affiliated with any 
religion. Other religions, such as Mormons, account for no more than 2% of the total population independently 
(https://www.pewforum.org/2019/10/17/in-u-s-decline-of-christianity-continues-at-rapid-pace/). Therefore, a high 
local religiosity is likely driven by either Protestants or Catholics.   
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expenses and higher work pressure. This suggests that local religiosity affects managers’ attitudes 
toward workplace safety, especially when they have lower discretionary resources for safety and 
higher performance pressure to increase firms’ productivity. We claim that such managers’ 
positive attitudes toward workplace safety could result from religiosity-induced informal 
interpersonal interactions within the community and workplace. In other words, a more robust 
regional community and workplace solidarity aroused by local religiosity may secure efficient 
allocation of limited resources (such as proper rewards, training, management commitment, 
effective communication, and employee participation) for safety and align the work assignments 
with the employees’ abilities and skills in a better way, which eventually drives the positive 
relationship between local religiosity and workplace safety.  
Furthermore, we provide several tests to unveil cross-sectional differences in the relation 
between religiosity and workplace safety issues. We find that the positive linkage between local 
religiosity and workplace safety is more pronounced in establishments of industries with lower 
union membership, establishments of firms with higher analyst coverage, and establishments 
located in counties with higher social capital. Based on these findings, we argue that religiosity 
has a substitutionary effect concerning industry union membership and a complementary effect 
concerning analyst coverage of a firm and regional social capital on advancing workplace safety. 
Our firm-level analysis finds that firms with higher establishment-level employee weighted 
religiosity are less likely to violate workplace conduct (work-related labor laws) and pay 
workplace violation penalties to different federal regulatory agencies. These firms are also more 
likely to undertake workplace safety measures and reduce employment uncertainty. 
Lastly, we examine the influence of workplace safety on firm performance measured by 
firm-level market-to-book ratio and Tobin’s Q. We find that workplace accidents are negatively 
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associated with firm performance, suggesting a value implication of local religiosity through 
human capital protection. This finding corresponds with human relations theories arguing that 
employee satisfaction and responsible employee treatment may ultimately benefit shareholders 
(see Akerlof (1982) and Lee and Mas (2012), among many others).  
Our study contributes to the growing literature on employee relations and finance by 
presenting compelling evidence that there is a substantial improvement in employee treatment and 
workplace safety in areas with high religiosity, which affects employee welfare to a great extent 
and potentially firm value as well. Extant finance literature shows that better employee treatment 
or satisfaction increases employee morale at the workplace, resulting in higher productivity and 
lower turnover (Harter et al. (2002)), better innovation productivity (Chen et al. (2016a); Chen et 
al. (2016b)), and higher stock returns (Edmans (2011); Edmans et al. (2014)), which all could 
eventually lead to stockholder wealth maximization. Building on this line of literature, our study 
proposes a value implication of local religiosity through human capital protection, demonstrating 
that corporate culture highlighted as managerial integrity could increase firm value through better 
employee relations. 
Our study also sheds light on how local religiosity is an influential factor shaping a relation 
between corporate culture and employee welfare. Since Hilary and Hui’s seminal work (2009), a 
voluminous amount of research has focused on the linkage between religiosity and risk-taking 
behavior and shown that local religiosity is associated with the level of corporate risk-taking 
behavior: cost of debt, earnings management, voluntary disclosure, corporate misbehavior, 
corporate financial reporting, innovation, venture capital investment decision, debt financing, and 
so on (e.g., Kanagaretnam et al. (2015); Dyreng et al. (2012); El Ghoul et al. (2012); Cai and Shi 
(2017); Chircop et al. (2020a); among many others). Instead, we turn our attention to another 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3923727
8 
 
critical aspect of religiosity as a gauge for the community members’ propensity for social 
networking, homophilous interactions, and trust, and then we demonstrate its positive association 
with workplace safety. Hence, our findings add to a growing body of literature about the impact 
of social interaction and employee trust on different aspects of firms (e.g., Shi and Tang (2015); 
Lins et al. (2017)).  
Our findings have practical implications specifically for business owners, as running a 
business in a more religious area could play a role in enhancing firm value, if all other things are 
equal. They invest in their employees upon contract signing and bear a significant amount of risk 
since those investments often take a long time to see what comes up as a return. If workers get 
injured on the job before the talent of the workforce creates value, the business owners will assume 
the entire cost arising from the human capital loss. While governments may share the costs by 
implementing relevant regulations or offering a government subsidy if workplace accidents and 
injuries happen, our findings suggest a significant role of religiosity in workplace safety. That is, 
business owners in highly religious areas can internalize the costs related to workplace safety and 
would likely make additional investments in employee welfare. Rendering safe working practices 
to employees is initially costly, but could ultimately enhance shareholder wealth. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and prior 
findings. Section 3 describes the data and sample selection procedure. Section 4 describes the 
empirical results. Finally, the last section presents our conclusion. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1. The importance of employee treatment  
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The World Bank Council for Sustainable Development (1999) asserts that making good 
business includes both behaving ethically and contributing to “economic development and 
improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families as well as of the local community 
and society at large.” As this definition implies, the workforce represents one of the critical 
stakeholders of a firm. At the same time, the importance of human capital has been increasingly 
emphasized in the literature. Pfeffer (1996) mentioned human capital as one of the main driving 
forces for a firm’s competitive success. Furthermore, human capital, as a crucial asset and the 
source of value creation, can be lost easily when employees leave a firm (Hall and Lerner (2010)). 
Thus, the importance of employee treatment has received burgeoning attention.  
Markedly, a large body of literature has demonstrated that a firm’s treatment of its 
employees can yield a significant impact on the firm in numerous ways. For instance, Bae et al. 
(2011) find that firms treating their employees fairly maintain low debt ratios, implying that such 
firms have strong incentives to reduce the probability of financial distress. In addition, employee 
conditions are important determinants of firms’ cost of debt (Chen et al. (2012)) and the cost of 
equity (Chen et al. (2011)). Numerous papers also find that a firm’s investment in employee 
welfare can yield a favorable impact, such as more innovation success (e.g., Liu et al. (2020); Mao 
and Weathers (2019)). Moreover, Edmans et al. (2014) and Lee and Mas (2012) find that good 
employee treatment is positively associated with stock returns and market value, increasing 
shareholders’ wealth. Then, while the consequences of corporate irresponsibility toward 
employees are well understood, studies on the underlying internal or external mechanisms 
improving employee treatment are relatively scant. Hence, our focus is to extend this area of study 
by examining a relatively underexplored part, the determinant of employee treatment, measured 
as workplace safety events. 




2.2. Determinants of workplace safety 
Prior literature has discussed numerous elements affecting workplace safety. For example, 
Gillen et al. (2002) find that union workers are less likely to perceive risk-taking as a part of their 
job, and Morantz (2013) claims that unionization leads to fewer workplace injuries. Using a unique 
dataset based on factory audits of working conditions in Nike’s suppliers, Locke et al. (2007) find 
that monitoring efforts combined with interventions focused on halting the root causes of poor 
working conditions enhance working environments effectively, although monitoring alone does 
not produce substantial improvement in the suppliers’ working conditions. Additionally, Caskey 
and Ozel (2017) argue that firms that meet or just beat analyst forecasts are associated with 
decreases in discretionary expenses related to worker welfare, which is also related to an increase 
in workplace injuries or illnesses.  
At the same time, extant literature finds that workplace injuries occur when a workplace 
lacks proper rewards, training, management commitment, effective communication, and employee 
participation (e.g., Ali et al. (2009)). The relational coordination theory, developed in operational 
management literature, states that workplace coordination can increase through a shared goal, 
shared knowledge, mutual respect, and enhanced relationships among colleagues that facilitate 
effective communication, resulting in a safe working environment (Gittell (2002) and Pagell et al. 
(2015)). In this context, to what extent workplace culture plays a role in mitigating occupational 
injuries and illnesses would be a well-grounded topic to discuss.  
 
2.3. Religiosity and economic behavior 
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In this study, our focus is on the relationship between workplace safety and religiosity, 
which is a type of cultural factor that has been documented from different dimensions. For 
instance, Rupasingha (2009) shows that more religious U.S. counties exhibit better economic 
growth. Notably, several papers have shown that religiosity, as a part of corporate culture, affects 
different aspects of corporate behavior and has economic implications. Examining how religiosity 
affects corporate decision-making, Hilary and Hui (2009) document that firms in regions with 
higher levels of religiosity exhibit lower degrees of risk exposure, lower investment rate, and less 
growth. Besides, numerous studies explore how religiosity affects different aspects of corporate 
behavior, including accounting conservatism, corporate social responsibility, cost of debt, tax 
avoidance, earnings management, voluntary disclosure, corporate misbehavior, corporate financial 
reporting, innovation, venture capital investment decision, and debt financing (e.g., Bjornsen et al. 
(2018); McGuire et al. (2012); Boone et al. (2012); Kanagaretnam et al. (2015); Grullon et al. 
(2009); Dyreng et al. (2012); El Ghoul et al. (2012); Boahen and Mamatzakis (2015); Adhikari 
and Agrawal (2016); Cai and Shi (2017); Chircop et al. (2020a)). Primarily, much of finance papers 
have focused on one particular aspect of religiosity and coupled it with corporate risk-taking 
behaviors.  
Alternatively, there is another side of religiosity, concerning societal attitude, homophily, 
and social connection. There are specific attributes, especially regarding social attitude and 
network, found to be associated with more religious people. For instance, Guiso et al. (2003) claim 
that religious people are more trusting of other people, public institutions, and market outcomes. 
At the same time, such people are also more trustworthy as they are less willing to break the law 
or cheat. Hence, there could be an enhanced level of mutual trust and stronger bonding among 
religious people.  
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Moreover, another critical feature linked with religiosity is homophily, which refers to 
people’s well-known tendency to connect more with others sharing similar traits such as race, 
ethnicity, and education. Homophily has been shown to affect many different areas to a substantial 
degree. As an instance, Kleinbaum et al. (2013) show that there is a higher proportion of 
homophilous interactions among members within business units, job functions, offices, and quasi-
formal structures than across their boundaries. Furthermore, among numerous social distinctions 
that can divide people’s social worlds, McPherson et al. (2001) find religion as one of the solid 
traits for inbreeding homophily. Therefore, considering these different aspects of religiosity, 
primarily the risk-related feature and the one associated with social networks, we investigate which 
side of religiosity predominates to identify its relationship with workplace safety. 
Meanwhile, one may argue that the exclusiveness of religion could cause disputes among 
people with dissimilar religions and thereby deteriorate workplace interactions and safety. When 
an area, for instance, is highly religious but comprised of diverse religious denominations, 
establishments located in that area may not necessarily exhibit better workplace safety due to 
conflicts and unfavorable interactions among different religious adherents within the workplace. 
Thus, we later examine not only how local religiosity is related to workplace safety, but also 
whether the dominance of one religion in an area matters for workplace safety.  
 
3. Data and Sampling 
In this section, we describe the sample selection process, variables construction, and 
summary statistics. Our data mainly come from three different sources: the Occupational Safety 
and Health Administration (OSHA), the Association of Religion Data Archive (ARDA), and the 
Compustat database. 
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Our data on workplace injuries are collected from the OSHA. The Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) compiles the OSHA data initiative (ODI) that shows work-related injuries and 
illnesses from 2002 to 20116 through surveys with employers in manufacturing industries selected 
by a stratified sampling method under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, which involves 
approximately 80,000 establishments each year. 7  For each establishment, the OSHA records 
injuries and illnesses data, along with searchable establishment name, address, industry 
identification, the average number of employees, mean number of working hours, and indicator 
variables that specify whether an establishment experiences unusual events such as strikes or 
lockouts, facility shutdowns or layoffs, seasonal work, or natural disasters or adverse weather 
conditions. Several studies (e.g., Cohn and Wardlaw (2016), McManus and Schaur (2016), Caskey 
and Ozel (2017), Bradley et al. (2019), Cohn et al. (2020)) have used the OSHA data as a primary 
source of workplace safety research.  
We use this data to construct annual measures of injuries and illnesses at the establishment 
level. Our primary measure of injury is the natural logarithm of the sum of deaths and all injuries 
and illnesses that result in days away from work or with job restrictions or transfers, and other 
recordable cases at the establishment in a given year (Column G + Column H + Column I + 
Column J of OSHA Form 300). In our robustness tests, we use an alternative measure of 
establishment-level injury: Total Case Rate (TCR) and Injury Rates with Days Away, Restricted, 
 
6 While the OSHA compiled data since 1996, our sample period begins in 2002 because the OSHA changed 
its recording criteria for injuries and illnesses and the coverage of industries in 2002. The pre-2002 years’ injuries and 
illnesses data are not comparable to those after the change made in 2002. Although the OSHA discontinued the ODI 
collection initiative in 2011 due to funding cuts, we end up our sample year in 2010 because our religion data from 
ARDA decennial survey data are available up to 2010. 
7 With a broad mandate to reduce injuries and illnesses in America’s workplaces, the OSHA requires all 
establishments with 11 or more employees to maintain log recording injuries and illnesses. Using this log record, the 
OSHA can spot establishments with serious workplace safety issues and take initiatives to ensure that “an America 
whose workplaces, as far as possible, are free from hazards that are causing or likely to cause death or physical harm.” 
See the OSHA’s justification at https://www.osha.gov/Reduction_Act/SS2091999.html 
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or Transferred (DART)8. TCR and DART represent the establishment-level incident rate per 100 
full-time employees in a given year. We also use a different measure of establishment-level injury, 
which is the natural logarithm of the number of days away from work (Column K) due to work-
related injuries and illnesses9. 
Our data on county-level religiosity come from the Churches and Church Membership files 
of the Association of Religion Data Archive (ARDA). The Glenmary Research Center collects 
data from decennial surveys on religious affiliation in the U.S. (1971, 1980, 1990, 2000, and 2010). 
In the 2010 decennial survey year, it compiles data on the number of congregations and adherents 
for 236 religious groups. As per the ARDA10 definition, total adherents include “all members, 
including full members, their children, and the estimated number of other participants who are not 
considered members; for example, the “baptized,” “those not confirmed,” “those not eligible for 
Communion,” “those regularly attending services,” and the like.” The decennial survey data on 
religious adherents are available on the ARDA website11 under the title “Religious Congregations 
and Membership File.”  
For our analyses, we use the datasets for 1990, 2000, and 2010 to construct our measure of 
county-level religiosity. The main variable of interest is the degree of religiosity in the counties in 
which a firm’s establishments are located. We compute county-level religiosity as the number of 
religious adherents in the establishment county divided by the total population in the county as 
 
8 Following the OSHA’s definition, Total Case Rate (TCR) is the number of cases in a given establishment-
year divided by the number of hours worked by all employees at the establishment in a given year and then multiplied 
by 200,000. The resulting value of TCR indicates the incident rate of injuries and illnesses per 100 full-time 
establishment-level employees in a given year. Injury Rates with Days Away, Restricted, or Transferred (DART) is 
measured as the sum of the number of injuries and illnesses that result in days away from work or with job restrictions 
or transfer, divided by the number of hours worked by all employees in a given establishment-year, and then multiplied 
by 200,000.  
9 While the other measures are about the number of injuries and illnesses, this measure captures the number 
of days in total that are unproductive due to injury incidence. 
10 See the ARDA website at http://www.thearda.com/Archive/Files/Descriptions/RCMSCY10.asp 
11 Religious data available at http://www.thearda.com/Archive/ChCounty.asp 
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reported by ARDA. Thus, the higher value of religiosity represents more religious adherents in the 
county. Following previous literature (Alesina and La Ferrara (2000); Hillary and Hui (2009); and 
Adhikari and Agrawal (2016)) on religiosity, we linearly interpolate the data to estimate the values 
for missing years (e.g., 1991-1999 and 2001-2009). 
In addition, we collect establishment-county level demographic variables from the U.S. 
Census Bureau. We use the establishment county population’s median age, level of education, 
population, percentage of married people, and social capital12 as county-level control variables that 
might affect workplace safety issues. As in the estimation of missing years’ county-level 
religiosity, we linearly interpolate missing years’ county-level demographic variables. 
Our accounting data come from Compustat annual files. We calculate several firm-level 
control variables following the work of Cohn and Wardlaw (2016). Firm-specific control variables 
include leverage, cash flow, dividends, firm size (Ln(Assets)), asset turnover (Turnover), 
tangibility, capital expenditure (Capex), and market to book ratio (MB). The detailed variable 
constructions are available in Appendix A. We also control for establishment-level variables such 
as establishment size (Ln(EstbEmp)) measured as the natural logarithm of the number of 
employees and working hours per employee (Ln(WorkHour)). To address the effect of the possible 
influence of outliers, we winsorize all of these variables at the top and bottom 1% level. Following 
Cohn and Wardlaw (2016) and Caskey and Ozel (2017), we delete financial institutions [Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) Codes 6000-6999] and utility suppliers [Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) Codes 4900-4999]. We also exclude the observations with missing values.  
 
12 We collect social capital data from https://aese.psu.edu/nercrd/community/social-capital-resources 
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We use the Compustat-OSHA injury and illness link table13 of Caskey and Ozel (2017)14 
to match each establishment with its Compustat firm. To merge OSHA data with ARDA data, we 
match them by Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) code and calendar year. After 
merging OSHA establishment-level injuries and illnesses and ARDA county-level religion data 
with Compustat data, our final sample consists of 72,287 establishment-year observations with 
5,268 unique establishments and 1,615 unique firms.  
 Table 1 provides summary statistics for establishment-level, county-level, and firm-level 
variables. The average establishment in our sample has 250 employees, and employees work for 
an average of 1,941 hours per year. In terms of our measure of workplace safety, the mean and 
median values of the number of cases that result in days away from work or in transfers and other 
recordable cases are 16.30 and 7 per establishment, respectively, in a given year. Our alternative 
measures of workplace safety issues are TCR and DART, the establishment-level incident rate per 
100 full-time employees in a given year. The mean and median values of TCR are 7.76 and 6.14, 
while the mean and median values of DART are 5.09 and 3.63, respectively. The mean DART 
implies that, in an average establishment year, an employee has a 5.1% probability of sustaining a 
work-related injury and illness that result in days away from work or with job restriction or transfer, 
in an average establishment year.  
The county-level religiosity, measured as the percentage of people who belong to a church 
in each county, exhibits the mean and median values of 50.70% and 50.50%, respectively. The 
standard deviation of religiosity is 11.20%, indicating a fair amount of variation in our religiosity 
 
13 See the Compustat-OSHA injury and illness link table at https://sites.google.com/view/bugraozel/data 
14 Caskey and Ozel (2017) manually match establishments from the ODI to firms in Compustat based on 
names. If any search does not produce any matches, they conduct additional searches through Hoovers, 
company/establishment websites, and other online resources to identify whether the establishment matches with a 
subsidiary of a Compustat firm. 
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variable15. The establishment-county population age has a mean and median of 36.69 and 36.60 
years, respectively. The mean and median percentages of the establishment county age 25+ 
population with at least one year of high education are 83.01% and 84.16%, respectively. On 
average, 19.20% of establishment-county people are married. Each establishment county has a 
population of 890,552 (308,760) in terms of its mean (median) value.  
The mean and median values of the total assets are $31.58 billion and $10.50 billion, 
respectively, which indicates that the firms used in our sample are relatively large. On average, a 
firm has 27.30% total debt in its capital structure. The average cash flow is about 9.80% of total 
assets. The average dividend paid to common stock is 1.80% of total assets. Asset turnover 
averages $1.45 of sales per dollar of beginning assets, and capital expenditure averages 5.60% of 
beginning assets. On average, property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) or tangible assets are about 
38.00% of our sample firm’s total assets. The mean firm in our sample has an asset market-to-
book ratio of 1.35. 
[Table 1, about here] 
Sampling distribution and cross-tabulation of injuries and illnesses analysis over the years 
are depicted in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the sample over the years. 
Observations in our sample are almost evenly distributed over the sample period, with few 
exceptions. In the years 2009 and 2010, the number of observations is relatively lower than in 
previous years. Figure 2 shows the distribution of the average number of cases, Total Case Rate 
(TCR), and Injury Rates with Days Away, Restricted, or Transferred (DART) over the sample 
years. Both the number and rate of cases have decreased over the years. 
[Figures 1&2, about here] 
 
15 The statistics of county-level religiosity are comparable to those in Hilary and Hui (2009). 




4. Empirical Results 
4.1 The effect of religiosity on establishment-level work-related injury and illness 
 We examine the relation between local religiosity and establishment-level workplace 
injuries in an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression framework. We employ the following 
baseline empirical model that links the measures of establishment-level workplace injuries of firm 
j in year t to the county-level religiosity and a vector of the firm and establishment-specific control 
variables in year 𝑡.  
𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑢𝑚_𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠) , , = 𝑎 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑦 , , + ∑ 𝛽   ∗ 𝐸 , , + ∑ 𝛽   ∗ 𝑋 , +
𝐹𝐸𝑠 + 𝜀 , ,             (1),   
where p and q are numbers, and i, j, and t index establishments, firms, and years respectively. 
𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑢𝑚_𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠) , ,  is the key dependent variable, computed as the natural logarithm of the sum 
of deaths and all injuries and illnesses that result in days away from work or with job restriction 
or transfers, and other recordable cases at the establishment in a given year. The main variable of 
interest is Religiosity, computed as the percentage of religious adherents of the total county 
population in a given establishment-county year. The higher values of the coefficient estimate on 
Religiosity in a negative direction indicate that the employees of the establishments resided in more 
religious counties get less injured than those in less religious counties, and vice-versa. E captures 
the establishment-level controls that include county-level demographic variables, establishment 
size (Ln(EstbEmp)), and working hours per employee (Ln(WorkHour)). Following Hilary and Hui 
(2009) and Adhikari and Agrawal (2016), we consider the county population (Ln(Pop)), median 
age (Ln(MedAge)), percentage of people having at least one year of high school education (Educ), 
and percentage of married people (Married) as our county-level demographic variables. We also 
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control for social capital (SocialCap) to capture non-religious community solidarity. These county-
level demographic variables are correlated with county-level religious participation; we want to 
disentangle the pure religious participation effect per se from simply being correlated with the 
other demographic characteristics. X represents a set of firm-specific variables that have been 
shown to affect changes in workplace safety investment; they are leverage, cash flow, dividends, 
firm size (Ln(Assets)), asset turnover (Turnover), tangibility, capital expenditure (Capex), and 
market to book ratio (MB). Our regression model includes firm or establishment and year fixed 
effects to capture the time-invariant and firm-level unobservable shock. All standard errors are 
robust to heteroskedasticity and corrected for the clustering of observations by establishment 
county.  
Table 2 reports the estimates from the empirical model (1). The first column reports the 
univariate results, while Columns (2) and (3) include controls and the firm/establishment and year 
fixed effects, respectively. The coefficient on Religiosity in Column (1) is negative and statistically 
significant, which shows that employees of establishments located in counties with a higher level 
of religiosity experience better workplace safety performance. When we add firm and year fixed 
effects in Column (2), the coefficient on Religiosity remains negative and statistically significant 
at the 5 percent level. In this column, speaking of economic magnitude, an increase by a standard 
deviation of local religiosity leads to a decrease in cases of work-related injuries by 1.50% (=exp(-
0.130*0.112)-1). With establishment fixed effects used in place of firm fixed effects in the last column, 
the same relation remains qualitatively. The magnitude of the coefficient estimates on Religiosity 
varies from -0.130 to -0.247 across these specifications.  
When we turn our attention to the firm and establishment-specific control variables that 
literature has shown to affect changes in workplace safety investment, we find the expected results. 
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For example, Cohn and Wardlaw (2016) show that firm-level leverage, tangibility, and log of 
employees are positively related to injury rate, while capital expenditure and firm size are 
negatively associated with establishment injury. The coefficients of our control variables are in 
line with those results in the workplace safety literature. 
This table shows that, in all our specifications, workplace injury is negatively related to 
establishment-county level religiosity. In other words, the results from our baseline regression 
indicate that county-level religiosity positively affects employee welfare, and these results are 
consistent with our conjecture that local religious culture has a positive association with employee 
treatment, enhancing the working environment and employee welfare. However, one may be 
concerned with our finding as establishment-level safety-related activities could be driven by firm-
level budgetary and policy initiative decisions. Regardless of the establishments’ location, the 
parent firm equally sets the safety budget and policy initiatives for all of its establishments. Then, 
how could establishments of the same firm exhibit different levels of workplace safety? We 
respond to this concern by claiming that, while safety-related budgetary and policy initiative 
decisions are made at the firm level, safety-related activities are implemented at the establishment 
level. For instance, Cohn and Wardlaw (2016) contend that establishment managers may cut safety 
expenditure in order to meet short-run budgeted cost targets. When the implementation of safety 
programs is at the divisional managers’ discretion, the local community members’ homophilous 
social networks and mutual trust solidified through religious belief could significantly influence 
the local establishments’ responsible treatment of their employees. 
[Table 2, about here] 
 
4.2 Types of religious adherents and workplace safety 
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In this section, to further investigate the nature of the relation between local religiosity and 
workplace safety, we examine whether our baseline results are sensitive to a risk-based explanation 
of religious effects on employee treatment or depend on religious denominations considering 
differences between religious groups. Our argument is based on community solidarity and 
interpersonal interaction induced by the religious network, while a number of studies (e.g., Kumar 
et al. (2011); Gao et al. (2017); and Chircop et al. (2020a)) investigate the effect of local religiosity 
on several corporate policies based on organizational risk-taking behavior. Regarding this 
distinction, some may be skeptical about whether workplace injuries and illnesses in this research 
are simply proxy for risk-taking. To address this concern, we re-estimate our main analysis 
controlling for the level of risk.  
Specifically, we include several risk-based control variables in our baseline model and re-
estimate the results. In this analysis, risk-based control variables include state-level revenue from 
selling lottery tickets as a percentage of gross domestic product, standard deviation of firm’s stock 
return, standard deviation of operating performance, and research & development expense. 
Besides, we also draw on risk-taking traits often linked with Catholics in previous literature. 
Several studies (Hilary and Hui (2009), for example) have highlighted how religious groups are 
different from one another. For instance, Protestant denominations are more likely to be involved 
in religious activities (e.g., higher church attendance and financial contributions to churches) and 
frequently interact with one another. In addition, numerous studies on local religiosity show that 
Catholics are more prone to risk-taking compared to Protestants in diverse areas of decision 
making, such as gambling, innovation, stock investment, and corporate investment (e.g., Kumar 
(2009); Kumar et al. (2011); Schneider and Spalt (2016); among many others). There are also 
studies on the differences and similarities between Protestants and Catholics, focusing on their 
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workplace and social ethics (e.g., Arrunada (2010)). Considering distinctions between different 
religious denominations, we divide our sample based on the dominance of Catholic adherents in 
counties and run our baseline regressions separately for those subsamples. 
Table 3 Panel A provides results after adding risk-based controls to our baseline model. If 
our main findings are relevant to a risk-based explanation or if our key dependent variable 
(workplace injury and illness) is a proxy for organizational risk-taking, the significant coefficient 
on religiosity would fade away. Nevertheless, in Columns (1) and (2), the coefficient estimates on 
religiosity are negative and statistically significant even after controlling for state-level lottery, 
return volatility, ROA volatility, and R&D. In addition, we divide our sample into two groups 
based on the dominance of Catholic adherents in each county, since Catholics are more prone to 
risk-taking compared to Protestants in diverse areas of decision making (e.g., Kumar (2009); 
Kumar et al. (2011); and Schneider and Spalt (2016)). If the risk-based explanation drives our key 
findings, we would observe a stronger effect of religiosity in the high Catholic group and also a 
substantial difference between the high and low Catholic groups. Columns (3) through (6) show 
that both groups’ coefficient estimates are negative and statistically significant, and their 
differences are insignificant. Therefore, we conclude that our findings are likely driven by 
homophilous characteristics embedded in religiosity, and this analysis bolsters our argument based 
on community solidarity and homophily for our main findings.  
We also employ an alternate approach to alleviate the concern about the risk-based 
explanation for our finding. Considering the differences between religious denominations, we 
examine if our baseline results change for different religious orientations. Since Protestant and 
Catholic are the two most popular religions in the U.S., we first measure local religious ideology 
(Rel_Ideo) as the ratio of Protestant adherents minus the ratio of Catholic adherents divided by 
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their sum. Rel_Ideo has a value that ranges from -1 to 1. A value of 1 (-1) for Rel_Ideo indicates 
that the local community's religious identity is dominated by Protestant (Catholic) ideology. Then, 
to capture the dominance of one religion in a given county, we use the absolute value of Rel_Ideo 
(i.e., Abs(Rel_Ideo)) in the regression. As such, the Abs(Rel_Ideo) represents whether the county 
is religiously dominated by one religious group (either Protestant or Catholic). Secondly, we 
construct the Herfindahl index (i.e., Rel_HHI) based on religious adherents by incorporating all 
minor religions (e.g., Orthodox), although other minority religious groups only account for less 
than 2% in any county.  
Panel B reports the results. In Columns (1) and (2), the results show a negative relation 
between Abs(Rel_Ideo) and the number of workplace accidents, indicating that dominance by 
Protestant or Catholic religious groups in a given county results in lower workplace injury for that 
county’s establishment. In Columns (3) and (4), we also find that Rel_HHI is negatively associated 
with the number of workplace accidents. It confirms that workplace safety is affected by whether 
local community members are solidified through sharing identical religious ideologies. When one 
particular religious denomination is more prevalent in an area, the community would be more 
likely to get solidified and closer through shared common beliefs, ideologies, and homophily. 
Hence, this finding is consistent with the relational coordination theory (e.g., Gittell (2002)), which 
claims that workplace safety environment could be enhanced by the relationship among workers 
and the resulting workplace coordination.   
Recall from our postulation that local community members’ homophilous social networks 
and mutual trust solidified through religious belief significantly influence firms’ responsible 
treatment of their local employees. We acknowledge that the effect of local religiosity on an 
economic outcome could be jointly influenced by social ties of local communities other than 
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religion. For example, local community members’ homophilous social networks and mutual trust 
could be solidified through informal networking (e.g., bowling clubs), which can be captured by 
social capital. Alternatively, local community members’ homophilous social networks and mutual 
trust could overlap with those nested in an ethnic group. To address this concern, we add Ethnicity-
HHI, based on the ethnic origin of people (e.g., White, Black, Asian, or Hispanic16) in a given 
county, to our estimations, in addition to social capital included in all our regressions. The results 
reported in Columns (5) and (6) show that the effect of local religiosity is not subsumed by 
ethnicity homophilous interactions in the county.  
[Table 3, about here] 
 
4.3 Potential mechanisms through which religiosity affects workplace safety 
To test our hypothesis considering the plausible mechanisms through which local 
religiosity affects workplace safety, we rely on recent research on workplace safety (e.g., Caskey 
and Ozel (2017); Bradley et al. (2019); and Bai et al. (2020)). These studies suggest that workplace 
injuries result from reducing investment in workplace safety and increasing managerial pressure 
for short-term performance. Thus, we investigate how local religiosity affects workplace safety 
through those two mechanisms.  
First, we expect that managers present with community solidarity and trust through 
religious networks in the establishment county will use safety investment funds efficiently, 
especially when they are limited. Safety investments include the cost of maintenance, plant 
improvements, setting up and enforcing safety policies, training, and oversight programs. 
However, the limitation is that there are no traceable records of these items and that no company 
 
16 We collect data on county-level demography and ethnicity from 
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2011/compendia/usa-counties-2011.html 
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reports them separately in the Compustat database. Since we do not have the luxury to extract 
employee safety expenses from the Compustat database, we estimate discretionary safety 
expenditure following Caskey and Ozel (2017). Sales, general, and administrative (SG&A) 
expenses include some product promotional and managerial costs. And, we adopt the following 
model to measure the residual as a proxy for discretionary employee safety expense. 
𝑆𝐺&𝐴 ,
𝐸𝑀𝑃 ,






+  𝜀 ,             (2) 
where SG&A is selling, general, and administrative expenses, and EMP indicates the 
number of employees reported in the Compustat database. As in Caskey and Ozel (2017), we scale 
SG&A and EMP by beginning employees rather than beginning assets. We then take the residual 
from the model (2) within each two-digit SIC coded industry-year to measure our discretionary 
safety expenditure. Then, we assume that any abnormal discretionary expense per employee, 
measured by the residual from the model, can be particularly set for employee safety expenses. 
We then create subsamples based on the median value of the absolute discretionary safety expense.  
Panel A of Table 4 reports the regression results for the subsamples. The coefficient 
estimates on religiosity are negative and statistically significant when discretionary safety 
expenses are lower (below median value), while they are insignificant for the group with higher 
discretionary safety expenses. The differences between the two groups are statistically significant 
at the 1 percent level as well. This result suggests that when managers have limited discretionary 
safety funds, community solidarity and homophily formed through the local religious network 
have a more substantial effect on inducing those managers to be more efficient in allocating those 
resources for workplace safety. 
Considering another channel, we investigate whether local religiosity encourages managers 
to pay attention to workplace safety when they are under productivity pressure. When religiosity 
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solidifies mutual trust and homophilous interaction within the local community, the local 
community members would be less likely to abuse one another by dint of their power and authority. 
For example, establishment managers may not assign extra work to their file and rank employees 
or force them to work beyond their capacity or in an unsafe working condition. So, we expect that 
managers with stronger community solidarity will adequately align the job assignments with 
employees' skills and abilities, even when they are under pressure to increase productivity by 
increasing working hours, new job assignments, and so on. Following Caskey and Ozel (2017)17, 
we define work pressure as the sum of the cost of goods sold and changes in inventory divided by 
the total number of employees. Then, we divide our sample into two groups based on work pressure. 
A firm is in the high (low) work pressure group if its productivity is higher (lower) than or equal 
to its median during the sample period.  
The results are presented in Panel B of Table 4. The coefficient estimates on religiosity are 
negative and statistically significant when managers face performance pressure that results in work 
pressure for file-and-rank employees. In Columns (1) and (2), the coefficients on Religiosity are -
0.206 and -0.218 with substantial statistical significance (t-statistics of -2.97 and -3.35), 
respectively. On the contrary, they are not significant for the group with lower work pressure. 
Hence, the effect of local religiosity is evident, particularly for the high work pressure group. The 
results support our conjecture that managers are less likely to exploit their file and rank employees 
by assigning extra work, wrong work orders, or poor working conditions when community 
solidarity, mutual trust, and homophilous interactions are induced by local religiosity. In sum, 
establishment county-level religiosity has a significant association with employee safety 
 
17 Caskey and Ozel (2017) suggest that work pressure increases in order to meet or beat the analysts’ earnings 
targets, which results in workers' injury and illness. 
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investment and work pressure, and we argue that such effects could be potential channels through 
which local religiosity affects workplace safety.18 
[Table 4, about here] 
 
4.4 Subsample analyses: Heterogeneity in the effect of religiosity on workplace safety 
In this section, we examine the cross-sectional differences in the effect of religiosity on 
workplace safety issues. We focus on three aspects of heterogeneity in the influence of religiosity: 
industry-level union membership, analyst coverage, and county-level social capital.  
We first investigate whether industry-level union membership has an impact on the relation 
between religiosity and workplace safety, using data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. In 
Panel A of Table 5, Columns (1) and (2) report the estimates from the baseline regression Model 
(1) with union membership added as a control variable. In both columns, Religiosity is negatively 
related to workplace safety outcomes. Hence, our baseline result survives even after controlling 
for union membership, and the results also show that union membership is positively related to 
work-related injury and illness. However, the relation could merely represent a correlation, rather 
than a causal relation, between union membership and workplace safety because jobs with higher 
 
18 There can also be some views that religious employees could be more risk-averse or take proactive actions 
for their safety, leading to less workplace injuries. Nevertheless, we are not able to carry out empirical tests about 
employees’ behaviors since we do not possess measures for employees’ behaviors regarding their safety in the 
workplace, to the best of our knowledge. Moreover, we would like to assert that employees’ safety-related attitudes 
need to be encompassed by managers’ actions caring for the safety of those employees, in order to actually result in 
better workplace safety measures. In other words, even if religious employees are risk-averse in the workplace, 
workplace injuries might not decrease substantially when managers are not ensuring safe working conditions, with 
the absence of mutual trust and homophilous interactions in the workplace. Thus, we believe the mechanisms based 
on managers’ actions, induced by community solidarity and homophily, that we find for the relation between 
religiosity and workplace safety would be more influential. 
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risks related to injury and illness are more likely to be unionized (Hirsch and Berger (1984)). Also, 
in the literature, the influence of union membership on workplace safety is inconclusive19.  
Then, we treat an establishment as having labor union coverage if its firm operates in an 
industry with above-median union membership, and vice versa. When we divide our sample into 
groups based on industry union membership, we find that the coefficients on Religiosity are 
statistically significant only for the group of low union membership establishments. In Columns 
(5) and (6), the coefficients on Religiosity for firms operating in the industry having low union 
membership are -0.264 and -0.297 and statistically significant at the 1 percent level (t-statistics -
3.71 and -4.06), respectively. Overall, the results from Panel A provide evidence that the negative 
effect of religiosity on workplace safety is more pronounced for firms whose industry has low 
union membership. Although the results initially may seem at odds with our explanation, we argue 
that local religiosity has a substitutionary effect on workplace safety with respect to industry union 
membership.  
Next, we assess whether the relation between local religiosity and workplace safety varies 
with different levels of analyst coverage. Bradley et al. (2019) show that analysts investigate firms’ 
safety policies due to the cash flow implications of workplace safety issues on shareholder wealth. 
For example, Cohn and Wardlaw (2016) provide empirical evidence of firm value deterioration 
due to workplace injury and illness. Thus, it would be interesting to investigate how analysts’ 
efforts regarding firms’ safety policies and investments work alongside the effect of religiosity. 
As local analysts can have frequent on-site visits and better access to management via information 
 
19 When union serves as a collective voice (Freeman and Medoff, 1984), unionized workers may be more 
willing to express their preferences for workplace safety without fear of retaliation (Li and Singleton, 2019). Then, 
firms with unionized employees may experience lower workplace injuries and illnesses than those of their peers that 
have no unionized employees. On the other hand, Li et al. (2020) show that at the mean level, the union has no 
detectable effect but in downward injury distribution. 
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connections (e.g., social gatherings and religious networks) (O’Brien and Tan (2015)), we expect 
that local religiosity will enhance analysts’ personal connections (through informal meetings) with 
establishment employees and managers to get first-hand information about workplace safety. To 
see if there exists a cross-sectional difference in religiosity effect on workplace safety concerning 
analyst coverage, we create subsamples based on the median value of analysts' coverage.  
The results are reported in Panel B of Table 5. We find that the coefficients on Religiosity 
are statistically significant only for the group of high analyst coverage. The coefficients on 
Religiosity are -0.263 and -0.276 (whose t-statistics are -4.04 and -4.58) in Columns (1) and (2), 
respectively. These coefficient estimates are significantly different from their counterparts. This 
finding supports our conjecture that the religious network solidifies community relations, mutual 
trust, and easy access to soft information, which complements the investigation of analysts about 
workplace safety issues.   
Lastly, we investigate how the influence of local religiosity interacts with that of other 
social networks (e.g., social capital), inducing community solidarity and mutual trust. People can 
interact with one another through non-religious networks, such as attending labor organizations, 
business associations, golf courses, physical fitness programs, or sports clubs, which are the 
components of social capital. Further, social capital has been discovered to enhance mutual 
cooperation, facilitate transactions, and help firms get corporate contracts or access to external 
capital (Hasan et al. (2020)). We expect that mutual cooperation and community solidarity aroused 
by social capital will augment the effect of the religious network we show in this study. We create 
subsamples based on the median value of county-level social capital and report the results in Panel 
C of Table 5. We see the coefficient estimates on religiosity are statistically significant only for 
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the group with high social capital, suggesting a complementary effect between religiosity and 
social capital for workplace safety.  
In sum, our subsample analyses imply that religiosity has a substitutionary effect with 
respect to union coverage and a complementary effect with respect to a firm’s analyst coverage 
and establishment county’s social capital on advancing workplace safety. 
[Table 5, about here] 
 
4.5 Sensitivity analyses  
4.5.1 Endogeneity issues 
In this section, we perform a battery of robustness tests to show that our baseline findings 
are not driven by endogeneity issues. A major concern for our estimated effect could be a 
confounding effect since local religiosity is highly correlated with observable (e.g., age, gender, 
and education) and/or unobservable characteristics (e.g., personal mentality and family tradition) 
of local communities. We address this endogeneity issue in several ways.  
First, we estimate residual local religiosity orthogonalized to several relevant 
characteristics (e.g., age and education) since these relevant characteristics could drive a person’s 
religious participation. Particularly, we regress establishment county religiosity on income, 
population, education, married (%), the median age of the county population, political orientation, 
social capital, Chinese population, Mexican population, and the county population’s risky attitude, 
which is proxied by state revenue from lottery sales as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP). Then, we take the residual from the estimation 20  as an exogenous definition of our 
religiosity measure. Panel A of Table 6 reports the results from our baseline Model (1) run on this 
 
20 The results are reported in Appendix B. 
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alternative measure of our key independent variable, Religiosity. Columns (1) and (2) show that 
our baseline results are not sensitive to the confounding effect due to Religiosity being highly 
correlated with observable and unobservable county characteristics or religiosity measurement 
errors. The magnitude of the coefficients is similar to that reported in Table 2. 
Second, another primary concern regarding our findings could be that they might be driven 
by unspecified omitted variables that affect both a person’s religious participation and workplace 
injury in a county. To overcome this endogeneity issue, we employ the instrumental variable 
approach. Numerous studies on the effect of local religiosity (e.g., Hilary and Hui (2009) and 
Adhikari and Agrawal (2016)) use a decade earlier religiosity as an IV for their estimations. 
Similarly, we select the previous decade’s religiosity and 3 years lagged population as IV since 
they are highly correlated with contemporary local religiosity but less likely related to 
unobservable factors that influence workplace safety. In other words, religiosity a decade earlier 
and 3 years lagged county population will surely not affect workplace safety other than through 
contemporary religiosity. Hence, we employ the following two-stage model with an instrument 
variable (IV) of the lagged county-level religiosity and population. 
First-stage: 
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 , , = 𝑎 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 , , + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐿𝑛(𝑃𝑜𝑝) , , + ∑ 𝛽   ∗ 𝐸 , , +
∑ 𝛽   ∗ 𝑋 , + 𝐹𝐸𝑠 + 𝜀 , ,             (3),  
Second-stage: 
𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑢𝑚_𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠) , , = 𝑎 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑦 , , + ∑ 𝛽   ∗ 𝐸 , , + ∑ 𝛽   ∗
𝑋 , + 𝐹𝐸𝑠 + 𝜀 , ,             (4),  
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where p and q are numbers and i, j, and t index establishments-county, firm, and year, 
respectively. In the first stage, the key dependent variable is contemporary religiosity21. In the 
second stage, the key dependent variable is 𝐿𝑛(𝑁𝑢𝑚_𝐶𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠) , , , computed as the natural 
logarithm of the sum of deaths and all injuries and illnesses that result in days away from work or 
with job restrictions or transfers, and other recordable cases at the establishment in a given year. 
The primary variable of interest is Religiosity, and we use the same control variables used in Model 
(1). Also, as in the baseline regression, standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
corrected for the clustering of observations by establishment county. Panel B of Table 6 reports 
the estimates from our IV regression Models (3) and (4). The results are consistent with those 
reported in Table 2 as the coefficient on the predicted Religiosity is negative with statistical 
significance.  
Third, we further attempt to address the endogeneity issue using a difference-in-difference 
(DID) empirical approach. Since cultural values change slowly, it is difficult to find a genuinely 
exogenous shock that changes local religiosity. However, it is still valuable to see how workplace 
safety is affected by a certain event that drives changes in local religiosity. As such an event, we 
choose a migration shock, the inflow of people into a county. For this set of tests involving 
migration flows, we utilize “Statistics of Income (SOI) Tax Stats – County-to-County Migration 
Data”22. The data are based on year-to-year address changes reported on individual income tax 
returns filed with the IRS. Using this information, we identify county-level migration flows 
connecting the population’s county of current residence and where the residents migrate from.   
To form the treatment group, we first define high migration-in as the percentage of 
migration that comes from counties whose religiosity is greater than the yearly median of all 
 
21 The first-stage F-statistic is 380.47, which satisfies the minimum criteria of 10. 
22 Data are provided by the United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS) (http://www.irs.gov). 
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migration sending counties. Then, we consider firm-establishment as in a treatment group if its 
county's migration receiving is in the top decile of our sample migration-in, and control group 
otherwise. Treatment and control groups are one-to-one matched based on firm characteristics. We 
take the highest migration-in year for the treatment group as the event year and the following year 
as the post year, and the key variable of interest is the interaction between treatment and post 
dummy. Figure 3 shows the parallel trend of workplace injuries between treatment and benchmark 
groups for the pre-event years. After the migration shock, however, there is a greater decrease in 
workplace injuries for the treatment group than for the benchmark group (i.e., the slope of the line 
for the treatment group is steeper than that for the benchmark group after the intervention). When 
a county receives migration from other highly religious counties, the establishments in this county 
experience a noticeable drop in workplace injuries and illnesses. We interpret the difference 
between the blue dashed line and the blue dotted line of workplace injury for the treatment group 
as a result of the migration shock to the county because the migration shock increases the religious 
adherents in the receiving county. 
The results from our DID regressions are presented in Panel C of Table 6. The marginal 
effect of the positive shock to the establishment-level religiosity is negative and highly statistically 
significant, implying that local religiosity does matter in establishment-level work-related safety 
issues. The coefficient on the interaction between treatment and post in Column (1) is -0.074, 
which is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The result is qualitatively similar when we 
use establishment fixed effects instead of firm fixed effects in Column (2). 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
4.5.2 Additional robustness analyses 
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A potential concern could be that our results may be driven by sample selection bias since 
our tests are based on the locations of establishments and firms rarely locate their establishments 
in a random fashion. Thus, in order to alleviate the concern over the sample selection bias issue, 
we conduct a propensity score matching (PSM) analysis and report the results in Table 7.  
We divide the sample into five groups based on religiosity (quintile by firm and year). We 
then create a dummy variable equal to 1 if the establishment county religiosity is in the top quintile 
by firm and year, and zero otherwise. In the first stage, we test whether firm, establishment, and 
county characteristics affect a firm’s decision to locate one or more of its establishments in a highly 
religious county, and the results are reported in Panel A. Using the probit model, in Column (1), 
we see only three characteristics (establishment county-specific characteristics) have a small 
contribution to a firm’s choice to locate its establishment in a highly religious county. In Column 
(2), we re-run the probit model using the matched sample only. We find those two characteristics 
are not significantly different between the test group and the matched group. In Panel B, where we 
estimate our baseline regressions using both test and matched groups only, we find the negative 
effect of establishment county-level religiosity remains statistically significant on work-related 
injuries. Hence, this result, at least partially, alleviates concerns about potential sample selection 
bias in the presentation of the relation between local religiosity and workplace safety. 
[Table 7, about here] 
We further conduct a set of other additional robustness tests and include the results in 
Appendix C. The first test in Panel A uses a restricted sample of firms with multiple 
establishments. Panel B shows results based on alternative measures of work-related injury. We 
exclude illness from our comprehensive injury and illness measure, keeping only the injury 
portion. We also use the natural logarithm of the number of days away from work. Alternative 
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injury measures include injury rates (TCR and DART). TCR is the total number of cases in a given 
establishment year divided by the number of hours worked by all employees at the establishment 
in a given year and then multiplied by 200,000. DART is the number of injuries and illnesses that 
result in days away from work or with job restriction or transfer, divided by the number of hours 
worked by all employees in a given establishment year, and then multiplied by 200,000. Panel C 
reports the results from our baseline Model (1) with different fixed effects and firm clustering. In 
Panel D, we address whether the results are driven by a few establishments in exceptionally high 
or low religious counties since our key variable of interest is the religiosity level of the counties 
where the establishments are located. Following Adhikari and Agrawal (2016) to find the most 
and/or least religious states, we address this concern by excluding establishment-year observations 
that are located in any counties within the five most religious states (MS, UT, AL, LA, and AR) 
and/or the five least religious ones (VT, NH, ME, MA, and RI). In all these tests, our main results 
continue to hold. A further concern might be that our key independent variable is linearly 
interpolated in the missing survey years, which could bias our results. To address this concern, in 
Panel E, we restrict our analysis to ARDA decennial survey years (2010 and 2002 for 2000 survey 
year) only. In Panels F and G, we control family firms and short interests23, respectively. Finally, 
in Panel H, we test whether the effect of religiosity exists in the financial crisis period (2007-2009). 
Overall, the results survive from these different sets of robustness checks.  
 
4.6 Firm-level evidence of religiosity and employee treatment 
 
23 According to Bai et al. (2020), the removal of short-selling constraints leads to a significant decrease in 
firms’ investment in workplace safety as well as higher work-related injury rates. They suggest that short-sellers’ 
pressure can have an impact on workplace safety.  
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In this section, we check the validity of our main findings. If religiosity influences 
managers’ attitudes toward workplace safety, leading to fewer injuries and illnesses of workers, 
there would be some firm-level evidence of employee treatment concerning religiosity. We 
provide several firm-level evidence with respect to religiosity, including firm-level employee-
related violations24, health and safety measures, and employment uncertainty.  
Firstly, we examine whether establishment-level employee-weighted religiosity affects 
employee-related violations, including non-compliance with labor laws, health and safety 
violations, and other violations related to labor exploitation. We also examine how religiosity 
affects a firm’s likelihood of receiving federal penalties for violating labor laws. Following 
Chircop et al. (2020b) and Li and Raghunandan (2020), we define violation as the total number of 
employee-related violations per year and penalty as the natural logarithm of the total penalty 
amount per year. We then regress this employee-related violation and penalty on our 
establishment-level employee weighted religiosity and other related control variables. We include 
three-digit SIC coded industry fixed-effect in this estimation. The results are reported in Panel A 
of Table 8. The coefficient estimates on employee weighted religiosity are negative and 
statistically significant for both violations and penalty amount. This result suggests that firms are 
less likely to violate employee-related laws and more likely to reduce the incidence and severity 
of employee-related violations (such as penalties).  
 
24 We collect labor-related violation data from the Violation Tracker. We also thank Phil Mattera of Good 
Jobs First for providing us with access to workplace inspection data from the Violation Tracker database. This database 
contains workplace inspections by eight federal agencies: The Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA), 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA), 
Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of Health & Human Services Office of Inspector General 
(HHSOIG), Mine Safety & Health Administration (MSHA), Occupational Safety & Health Administration (OSHA), 
and Department of Labor Wage & Hour Division (WHD). 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3923727
37 
 
Secondly, we also investigate whether religiosity affects firms’ ethically responsible 
behavior towards their employees. Since our argument relies on the religiosity-induced community 
solidarity and trust in the establishment county, managers and their rank-and-file employees may 
get to know each other more than what their formal relationship would imply, which may not (if 
not improve) aggravate their rank-and-file employees’ employment uncertainty. As a result, we 
expect managers to take workers' health and safety measures more often and reduce their 
employment uncertainty. We collect workers’ health and safety strength and workforce reduction 
indicator data from KLD and test our hypothesis on employee weighted religiosity. Panel B of 
Table 8 reports the results. The coefficient on employee weighted religiosity in Column (1) is 
positive and statistically significant, suggesting that firms take measures to ensure workers’ health 
and safety in the workplace. The coefficient in Column (2) is negative and statistically significant, 
which implies that employees are more likely to be secured in their employment and that there is 
a proper alignment of job responsibility for employees. 
[Table 8, about here]  
 
4.7 Workplace accidents and firm performance 
In this paper, we have shown that local religiosity has an effect of improving workplace 
safety, signified by a reduced number of injuries in local workplaces. This finding leads us to 
question whether that relation between religiosity and workplace safety has any implications for 
firm value and performance. Hence, lastly, we examine to what extent workplace safety influences 
firm performance. And then, based upon that relation between workplace safety and firm 
performance, if there is any, we would be able to draw the inference regarding how religiosity as 
an influential factor for workplace safety has an (indirect) implication for firm performance. Since 
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the establishment-level performance measure is not publicly available, we carry out this test at the 
firm level and therefore utilize the aggregate number of workplace injuries and deaths at the firm 
level as our variable of primary interest. To measure firm performance, we use market to book 
ratio (MB) and Tobin’s Q. Then, to examine how aggregated workplace injuries are related to these 
firm performance measures, we use the system generalized method of moments (SGMM) 
technique, which considers the endogeneity of firm size, leverage, sales growth, and cash flow in 
the model. In particular, SGMM estimation instruments endogenous variables with suitable lags 
of their own and lagged differences.  
Table 9 reports the results. We find that workplace accidents are negatively associated with 
firm performance regardless of its measurement as MB or Tobin’s Q. Economically speaking, a 
one percent increase in Ln(Num of Cases) leads to a decrease in MB (Tobin’s Q) by 0.025 (0.166). 
Thus, firms tend to exhibit better performance when they are associated with better workplace 
safety, which is significantly influenced by religiosity. To put it another way, from this negative 
impact of adverse workplace safety incidents on firm performance, we can infer that the effect of 
local religiosity promoting employee safety and welfare could go beyond and (indirectly) affect 
firm performance and, ultimately, shareholder wealth as well. This view broadly corroborates with 
prior studies on employee treatment, highlighting the importance of human capital protection. Like 
numerous studies, including Edmans (2011), documenting a positive effect of employee 
satisfaction on firm value, we show that workplace injuries as tangible events symbolizing 
employee welfare lead to a noteworthy consequence regarding firm performance. While we are 
not able to show a direct effect of local religiosity on firm value, our findings suggest a vital value 
implication of local religiosity, put into effect through its impact on human capital protection.    
[Table 9, about here]  





In this paper, we examine the effect of local religiosity on workplace safety. Using the 
establishment-level data compiling on the incidents of work-related injuries from the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration, we provide evidence that employees of the establishments 
resided in more religious counties get less injured compared to those in less religious counties. Our 
multivariate empirical tests lend strong support for our hypotheses, and our main results survive 
through a set of robustness tests. The basis for our finding is that religiosity significantly influences 
employee treatment by enhancing community solidarity and trust through informal social networks 
among residents. The religiosity-induced community solidarity influences managers’ attitude 
toward workplace safety, acting as a complement to workplace safety investment. Secondly, due 
to religious homophilous interaction between community members, establishment-level managers 
properly align the job responsibilities and allocate other necessary resources efficiently. Overall, 
our study shows that local religiosity is a critical element in determining employee treatment and 
workplace safety, which is linked with firm performance.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
 
This table reports summary statistics for measures of establishment-level employees’ deaths, and 
all injuries and illnesses, establishment-country level religiosity and demographics, and other firm-
specific control variables. Our sample consists of 72,287 establishment-year observations with 
1,615 (5,268) unique firms (establishments) covering the period 2002-2010. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% levels. Appendix A provides more details of all 
variables. 
 
Variable N Mean  SD P25 Median P75 
Num of Cases 72287 16.284 29.137 3.000 7.000 16.000 
Ln(Num of Cases) 72287 2.129 1.170 1.386 2.079 2.833 
EstbEmp 72287 249.661 432.418 75.000 127.000 226.000 
Ln(WorkHour) 72287 1940.90 324.89 1760.00 1994.45 2103.95 
Religiosity 72287 0.507 0.112 0.419 0.505 0.582 
Leverage 72287 0.273 0.162 0.150 0.252 0.373 
Cashflow 72287 0.098 0.079 0.065 0.102 0.146 
Dividends 72287 0.018 0.021 0.000 0.012 0.029 
Assets (bln) 72287 31.584 81.967 1.900 10.504 33.005 
Ln(Assets) 72287 8.959 1.837 7.550 9.260 10.404 
Turnover 72287 1.451 0.720 0.963 1.319 1.771 
MB 72287 1.352 0.767 0.796 1.135 1.746 
Tangibility 72287 0.380 0.186 0.228 0.363 0.550 
Capex 72287 0.056 0.038 0.027 0.044 0.074 
SocialCap 72287 -0.494 0.876 -1.113 -0.468 0.084 
MedAge 72287 36.692 3.634 34.110 36.600 38.940 
Married 72287 0.192 0.025 0.173 0.193 0.211 
Pop 72287 890552.6 1695717.7 92067.2 308760.0 886217.4 
Educ 72287 83.066 6.345 79.640 84.160 87.480 
Injuryonly 72287 16.898 51.539 3.000 7.000 15.000 
Daysawork 72287 276.66 1057.56 1.000 66.000 233.00 
TCR 72287 7.761 6.790 2.627 6.139 11.063 
DART 72287 5.094 5.162 1.137 3.630 7.461 
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Table 2: Baseline results 
 
This table presents the results from the OLS regression Model (1), where the key dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of the total number of cases of employees’ death, and injuries 
and illnesses that result in days away from work or with job restriction or transfers, and other 
recordable cases at the establishment in a given year. The key independent variable is Religiosity, 
measured as the number of religious adherents in a county divided by the county population in a 
year. Religiosity in the non-census year is determined by linear interpolation. All other 
independent variables are defined in Appendix A. Columns (2) and (3) include firm and year, and 
the establishment and year fixed effects, respectively. T-statistics are computed using standard 
errors corrected for clustering at the establishment-county level and reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable Ln(Num of Cases) 
    
Religiosity -0.247** -0.130** -0.151*** 
 (-2.21) (-2.45) (-2.95) 
Ln(WorkHour)  0.004*** 0.004*** 
  (11.70) (10.63) 
Ln(EstbEmp)  0.836*** 0.832*** 
  (117.73) (108.78) 
Leverage  0.156*** 0.110*** 
  (3.99) (3.03) 
Cashflow  0.378*** 0.262*** 
  (6.52) (4.70) 
Dividends  -0.426 -0.204 
  (-1.39) (-0.86) 
Ln(Assets)  -0.007 0.009 
  (-0.50) (1.45) 
Turnover  -0.013 -0.006 
  (-1.00) (-0.48) 
Tangibility  0.321*** 0.240*** 
  (5.02) (4.43) 
Capex  -0.636*** -0.700*** 
  (-4.54) (-5.24) 
MB  -0.021* -0.001 
  (-1.93) (-0.16) 
Ln(MedAge)  0.026 -0.037 
  (0.27) (-0.43) 
Educ  -0.368 -0.399* 
  (-1.49) (-1.69) 
Ln(Pop)  -0.000 0.010 
  (-0.02) (0.97) 
Married  0.343 0.454 
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  (0.68) (0.97) 
SocialCap  0.010 0.012 
  (0.81) (1.02) 
Constant 2.254*** -4.412*** -4.513*** 
 (42.22) (-10.49) (-10.87) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE No Yes No 
Estab. FE No No Yes 
N 72,287 72,287 72,287 
Adj. R2 0.001 0.664 0.711 
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Table 3: Riskiness perspective of religiosity and workplace safety 
 
This table presents the results from the OLS regression Model (1), where the key dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of the total number of cases of employees’ death, and injuries 
and illnesses that result in days away from work or with job restriction or transfers, and other 
recordable cases at the establishment in a given year. In Columns (1) and (2) of Panel A, we add 
different risk-based control variables in our baseline model, including state-level revenue 
generated from lottery selling as a percentage of states Gross Domestic Product (GDP), return 
volatility, ROA volatility, and R&D expenditure. Panel B provides results controlling different 
religious denominations. The key independent variable considers two different types of Religious 
adherent groups: Protestant orientation and Catholic orientation. Abs(Rel_Ideo) is the absolute 
value of Rel_Ideo, which is measured as the ratio of protestant adherents minus the ratio of 
catholic adherents divided by their sum. Rel_HHI is the Herfindahl index of different religious 
groups’ participation (Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox, and other) in churches, which is calculated 
as the sum of the squares of different religious adherents by county and year. In Columns (5) and 
(6), we add ethnicity as an additional control variable: Ethnicity_HHI is the Herfindahl index of 
different ethnicity origins (e.g., White, Black, Asian, and Hispanic) in the county. All other 
independent variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are computed using standard errors 
corrected for clustering at the establishment-county level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: With additional risk-based controls 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ln(Number of Cases) 
 Variable Controlling riskiness Catholic Group 
   High Low High Low 
       
Religiosity -0.127** -0.150*** -0.220*** -0.173*** -0.286*** -0.134** 
 (-2.37) (-2.94) (-2.91) (-2.66) (-3.75) (-2.10) 
       




       
Lottery -0.000 -0.002* 0.004 -0.002 0.001 -0.004*** 
 (-0.31) (-1.81) (1.53) (-1.25) (0.66) (-2.70) 
RETVOL -2.741*** -2.989*** -0.712* -1.908*** -0.748 -2.072*** 
 (-5.78) (-6.40) (-1.68) (-3.92) (-1.56) (-4.12) 
STD(ROA) -0.086 -0.065 -0.041 -0.104 -0.019 -0.123 
 (-1.11) (-0.87) (-0.48) (-1.41) (-0.22) (-1.63) 
R&D 0.761 -0.389 -0.481* -0.154 -0.485* -0.274 
 (0.99) (-0.58) (-1.82) (-0.32) (-1.70) (-0.58) 
Ln(WorkHour) 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (11.05) (10.10) (8.12) (8.24) (7.36) (7.07) 
Ln(EstbEmp) 0.837*** 0.833*** 0.822*** 0.842*** 0.814*** 0.842*** 
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 (117.58) (109.09) (73.71) (91.17) (71.55) (85.78) 
Leverage 0.232*** 0.176*** 0.419*** 0.097* 0.321*** 0.082 
 (5.34) (4.30) (5.97) (1.77) (5.05) (1.54) 
Cashflow 0.230*** 0.154** 0.382*** 0.060 0.294*** 0.047 
 (3.46) (2.40) (3.97) (0.67) (3.10) (0.55) 
Dividends -0.672** -0.319 -0.479 -0.550 -0.029 -0.550* 
 (-2.21) (-1.36) (-0.88) (-1.50) (-0.07) (-1.88) 
Ln(Assets) -0.004 0.004 -0.009 0.009 0.002 0.011 
 (-0.26) (0.67) (-0.39) (0.43) (0.24) (1.26) 
Turnover -0.014 -0.008 -0.027 0.002 -0.030 0.006 
 (-0.95) (-0.62) (-1.24) (0.10) (-1.42) (0.37) 
Tangibility 0.387*** 0.253*** 0.292*** 0.396*** 0.116 0.302*** 
 (5.44) (4.27) (2.69) (4.14) (1.28) (3.84) 
Capex -0.553*** -0.658*** -0.527** -0.467*** -0.629*** -0.613*** 
 (-3.83) (-4.83) (-2.09) (-2.64) (-2.81) (-3.57) 
MB -0.007 0.017* -0.016 0.012 0.013 0.025** 
 (-0.61) (1.90) (-1.01) (0.75) (0.91) (2.05) 
Ln(MedAge) 0.023 -0.043 -0.061 -0.091 -0.169 -0.102 
 (0.24) (-0.50) (-0.44) (-0.91) (-1.30) (-1.00) 
Educ -0.357 -0.398* -0.534 -0.258 -0.621* -0.178 
 (-1.46) (-1.70) (-1.51) (-1.29) (-1.68) (-0.91) 
Ln(Pop) 0.000 0.010 -0.007 -0.019*** 0.005 -0.009 
 (0.00) (1.03) (-0.53) (-2.69) (0.35) (-1.26) 
Married 0.338 0.464 0.747 0.332 1.093 0.304 
 (0.67) (1.00) (0.93) (0.71) (1.38) (0.65) 
SocialCap 0.008 0.011 -0.016 0.035*** -0.007 0.030** 
 (0.64) (0.97) (-0.77) (2.71) (-0.35) (2.24) 
Constant -4.332*** -4.319*** -3.950*** -3.759*** -3.619*** -4.048*** 
 (-10.10) (-10.23) (-6.18) (-6.49) (-5.79) (-6.60) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes No Yes Yes No No 
Estab. FE No Yes No No Yes Yes 
N 68,844 68,844 28,344 40,500 28,344 40,500 
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Panel B: Controlling religious types 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variable Ln(Num of Cases) 
       
Abs(Rel_Ideo) -0.088*** -0.098***     
 (-3.24) (-3.83)     
Rel_HHI   -0.253*** -0.270*** -0.236*** -0.258*** 
   (-4.96) (-5.43) (-4.80) (-5.31) 
Ethnicity_HHI     0.430*** 0.326*** 
     (6.61) (5.21) 
Lottery -0.000 -0.002* -0.001 -0.002* -0.000 -0.002* 
 (-0.36) (-1.93) (-0.38) (-1.95) (-0.35) (-1.89) 
RETVOL -1.254*** -1.361*** -1.258*** -1.357*** -1.280*** -1.363*** 
 (-3.18) (-3.07) (-3.20) (-3.07) (-3.21) (-3.07) 
STD(ROA) -0.108** -0.077 -0.109** -0.077 -0.107** -0.076 
 (-1.98) (-1.34) (-1.99) (-1.34) (-1.97) (-1.32) 
R&D -0.390 -0.505** -0.392 -0.508** -0.403 -0.509** 
 (-1.52) (-2.02) (-1.53) (-2.04) (-1.59) (-2.04) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Constant -4.406*** -4.396*** -4.047*** -4.006*** -4.266*** -4.169*** 
 (-10.38) (-10.61) (-9.28) (-9.45) (-9.81) (-9.79) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Estab. FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 68,844 68,844 68,844 68,844 68,844 68,844 
Adj. R2 0.665 0.713 0.665 0.713 0.667 0.714 
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Table 4: Potential mechanism through which religiosity affect workplace safety 
 
This table reports the relation between establishment-county religiosity and establishment-level 
employee treatment, proxied by the discretionary safety investment and work pressure. Panel A 
reports the results from the relation between Religiosity and workplace injury with respect to 
discretionary safety investment (see Model (2)). Panel B reports the relation between 
establishment-county religiosity and establishment-level employee work-pressure, proxied by the 
firm-level productivity. The key dependent variable is the work pressure, measured as the sum of 
the cost of goods sold and inventory changes divided by the total number of employees. The key 
independent variable is Religiosity, measured as the number of religious adherents in a county 
divided by the county population in a year. Religiosity in the non-census year is determined by 
linear interpolation. All other independent variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are 
computed using standard errors corrected for clustering at the establishment-county level and 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Religiosity and absolute discretionary expense 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Ln(Num of Cases) 
Abs Disc. Expense High Low High Low 
     
Religiosity -0.012 -0.247*** 0.032 -0.305*** 
 (-0.17) (-4.30) (0.43) (-5.52) 
 𝛽 =𝛽  
p-value= 0.0098 
 
𝛽 =𝛽  
p-value= 0.0003 
 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
     
Constant -4.205*** -4.190*** -4.357*** -4.254*** 
 (-7.78) (-7.47) (-8.50) (-7.39) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes No No 
Estab. FE No No Yes Yes 
N 35,654 35,981 35,654 35,981 
Adj. R2 0.672 0.658 0.725 0.694 
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Panel B: Religiosity and work pressure  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Ln(Num of Cases) 
Work pressure High Low High Low 
     
Religiosity -0.206*** -0.052 -0.218*** -0.080 
 (-2.97) (-0.83) (-3.35) (-1.28) 
     
 𝛽 =𝛽  
p-value= 0.099 
 
𝛽 =𝛽  
p-value= 0.126 
 
Controls Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
     
Constant -3.590*** -4.924*** -4.607*** -4.346*** 
 (-6.58) (-8.58) (-9.63) (-7.73) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes No No 
Estab. FE No No Yes Yes 
N 36,198 35,927 36,198 35,927 
Adj. R2 0.679 0.643 0.728 0.687 
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Table 5: Subsample analysis: Heterogeneity in religious effect on workplace safety 
 
This table reports the relation between establishment-county religiosity and workplace safety from 
the context of different subsamples, where the key dependent variable is the natural logarithm of 
the total number of cases of employees’ death, and injuries and illnesses that result in days away 
from work or with job restriction or transfers, and other recordable cases at the establishment in a 
given year. The key independent variable is Religiosity, measured as the number of religious 
adherents in a county divided by the county population in a year. Religiosity in the non-census year 
is determined by linear interpolation. Panel A represents a subsample based on establishments of 
firms operating under industry with high vs. low levels of labor union membership. Panel B 
represents a subsample based on whether the parent company of establishments has a higher 
number of analysts following. Panel C provides a subsample based on the establishment-county 
social capital. The high group indicates firms above the median values of their respective 
categories. All other independent variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are computed 
using standard errors corrected for clustering at the establishment-county level and reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Religious effect under industry labor union influence 
 Ln (Number of Cases) 
Variable   High Low  High Low 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
        
Religiosity -0.168*** -0.196*** -0.055 -0.264***  -0.051 -0.297*** 
 (-2.77) (-3.18) (-0.61) (-3.71)  (-0.56) (-4.06) 
        
   𝛽 =𝛽  
p-value= 0.069 
 
 𝛽 =𝛽  
p-value= 0.035 
 
Union  0.612*** 0.448*** -- --    
 (5.14) (3.82) -- --  -- -- 
        
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes No Yes Yes  No No 
Estab. FE No Yes No No  Yes Yes 
N 47,768 47,768 23,524 24,244  23,524 24,244 
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Panel B: Religious effect under analyst coverage 
 Ln (Number of Cases) 
 High Low  High Low 
Variable (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
Religiosity -0.263*** -0.066  -0.276*** -0.048 
 (-4.04) (-0.89)  (-4.58) (-0.64) 
      
 𝛽 =𝛽  
p-value= 0.059 
 𝛽 =𝛽  
p-value= 0.018 
      
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes  No No 
Estab. FE No No  Yes Yes 
N 25,036 25,953  25,036 25,953 
Adj. R2 0.668 0.682  0.707 0.729 
 
Panel C: Religious effect under high vs low social capital of the county 
 Ln (Number of Cases) 
 High Low  High Low 
Variable (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
      
Religiosity -0.155** -0.115  -0.204*** -0.104 
 (-2.33) (-1.39)  (-3.06) (-1.40) 
      
 𝛽 =𝛽  
p-value= 0.706 
 𝛽 =𝛽  
p-value= 0.287 
      
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes  No No 
Estab. FE No No  Yes Yes 
N 36,145 36,142  36,145 36,142 
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Table 6: Robustness checks 
 
Panel A uses a residual of Religiosity regressed on age, income, education, total population, 
married people, political orientation, social capital, Chinese and Mexican population, and risky 
attitudes of a county population, proxied by state lottery revenue as a percentage of states Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). Panel B reports the results from the Two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
regression analysis. The instruments are religiosity in 1990 and three years lagged county 
population. Panel C reports the result of estimates from difference-in-differences regressions 
exploiting migration shocks in a given county. The key independent variable is the interaction 
between treatment and post dummy. To form the treatment group, we first define high migration-
in as the percentage of migration that comes from counties whose religiosity is greater than the 
yearly median of all migration sending counties. Then, we consider firm-establishment as 
treatment if its county's migration receiving is in the top decile of our sample migration-in, and 
control group otherwise. Treatment and control groups are one-to-one matched based on firm 
characteristics. We take the highest migration-in year for the treatment group as the event year and 
the following year as the post year. All other independent variables are defined in Appendix A. T-
statistics are computed using standard errors corrected for clustering at the establishment-county 
level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Alternative definition of religiosity/residual 
 Ln (Num of cases) 
Variable (1) (2) 
   
Residual Religiosity -0.128** -0.141*** 
 (-2.49) (-2.81) 
   
Controls Yes Yes 
   
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes No 
Estab. FE No Yes 
N 72,287 72,287 
Adj. R2 0.664 0.711 
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Panel B: IV regression results 
 (1) (2) 
 First stage Second stage 
Variables Religiosity Ln(Num of Cases) 
   
Religiosity  -0.326*** 
  (-4.73) 
Religiosity1990 0.601***  
 (80.42)  
Ln(Pop)t-3 0.019***  
 (34.99)  
Ln(WorkHour) -0.000* 0.004*** 
 (-1.95) (11.84) 
Ln(EstbEmp) -0.000 0.837*** 
 (-0.11) (114.03) 
Leverage -0.008** 0.150*** 
 (-2.49) (3.88) 
Cashflow -0.007 0.373*** 
 (-1.46) (6.49) 
Dividends -0.032 -0.449 
 (-1.11) (-1.47) 
Ln(Assets) -0.002 -0.008 
 (-1.26) (-0.54) 
Turnover 0.001 -0.012 
 (1.48) (-0.89) 
Tangibility -0.002 0.311*** 
 (-0.45) (4.95) 
Capex -0.011 -0.644*** 
 (-0.92) (-4.64) 
MB 0.001 -0.022** 
 (1.58) (-2.02) 
Ln(MedAge) -0.187*** -0.004 
 (-21.82) (-0.04) 
Educ -0.247*** -0.454*** 
 (-15.83) (-2.78) 
Married 1.166*** 0.432 
 (28.18) (1.01) 
SocialCap 0.023*** 0.018* 
 (21.49) (1.75) 
Constant 0.660*** -3.694*** 
 (14.25) (-7.47) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
N 71,911 71,911 
Adj R2 0.665 0.664 
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Panel C. Migration shock 
 (1) (2) 
Variable Ln (Num of Cases) 
   
Treat*Post -0.074*** -0.070*** 
 (-3.16) (-2.87) 
Ln(WorkHour) 0.000*** 0.000** 
 (3.65) (2.51) 
Ln (EstbEmp) 0.840*** 0.832*** 
 (56.27) (47.96) 
Leverage -0.248** -0.229* 
 (-2.15) (-1.93) 
Cashflow 0.129 0.013 
 (0.77) (0.07) 
Dividends -1.026 -1.013 
 (-1.13) (-1.27) 
Ln(Assets) 0.028 -0.001 
 (0.69) (-0.08) 
Turnover 0.046 0.038 
 (1.14) (0.98) 
Tangibility 0.538*** 0.248 
 (3.03) (1.63) 
Capex -0.737 -0.396 
 (-1.60) (-0.80) 
MB 0.037 0.029 
 (1.10) (1.07) 
Ln (MedAge) -0.130 -0.149 
 (-0.81) (-0.95) 
Educ -0.335 -0.459 
 (-0.88) (-1.31) 
Married 0.065 0.556 
 (0.07) (0.66) 
Ln (Pop) -0.012 0.010 
 (-0.88) (0.77) 
Socialcap 0.037* 0.040* 
 (1.82) (1.83) 
Constant -1.688** -1.421** 
 (-2.35) (-2.19) 
Firm FE Yes No 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Estab. FE No Yes 
N 11,558 11,558 
Adj. R2 0.655 0.714 
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Table 7: Propensity score matching analysis 
 
This table presents the results from the propensity score matching analysis. Panel A reports results 
from the probit model, where the dependent variable is High Religiosity, measured as a dummy 
variable equal to one if the establishment county Religiosity is in the top quintile by firm and year. 
Religiosity is the number of religious adherents in a county divided by the county population in a 
year. Column (1) uses our full sample of establishments. Column (2) uses only a matched sample 
of establishments, establishments located in high religiosity counties, and their equivalent peers 
located in lower religiosity counties. Control variables include the same set of variables used in 
the previous analysis. Panel B reports result from the baseline Model (1) on the propensity score-
matched sample of establishments, where the key dependent variable is the natural logarithm of 
the total number of cases of employees’ death, and injuries and illnesses that result in days away 
from work or with job restriction or transfers, and other recordable cases at the establishment in a 
given year. All other independent variables are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are computed 
using standard errors corrected for clustering at the establishment-county level and reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: PSM matching (quintile) 
 Before Match After Match 
Variable (1) (2) 
  Pr(High_Religiosity=1) 
Ln(WorkHour) -0.001 -0.001 
 (-1.10) (-0.87) 
Ln(EstbEmp) 0.012 0.001 
 (0.80) (0.05) 
Leverage -0.017 0.133 
 (-0.20) (1.05) 
Cashflow 0.029 0.256 
 (0.24) (1.32) 
Dividends 0.153 -0.781 
 (0.22) (-0.77) 
Ln(Assets) -0.006 0.006 
 (-0.17) (0.13) 
Turnover 0.007 0.008 
 (0.25) (0.18) 
Tangibility -0.052 0.171 
 (-0.31) (0.71) 
Capex 0.088 -0.358 
 (0.25) (-0.72) 
MB -0.011 0.022 
 (-0.49) (0.60) 
Ln(MedAge) -0.817 0.175 
 (-1.08) (0.21) 
Educ  -4.419*** -0.188 
 (-3.45) (-0.14) 
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Married 0.066 -0.004 
 (1.26) (-0.06) 
Ln(Pop) 8.863*** -0.518 
 (2.89) (-0.15) 
SocalCap 0.380*** -0.016 
 (5.06) (-0.20) 
Constant 3.357 0.004 
 (1.13) (0.00) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE25 Yes Yes  
N 66,385 23,166 







25 Stata does not permit us to estimate PSM model with establishment fixed effects. 
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Panel B: The second stage regression 
 (1) (2) 
Variable Ln(Num of Cases) 
   
Religiosity -0.105* -0.128** 
 (-1.75) (-2.10) 
Ln(WorkHour) 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (7.15) (6.20) 
Ln(EstbEmp) 0.851*** 0.847*** 
 (91.51) (85.31) 
Leverage 0.176** 0.178*** 
 (2.43) (2.81) 
Cashflow 0.393*** 0.178 
 (3.32) (1.55) 
Dividends -0.352 -0.701 
 (-0.64) (-1.43) 
Ln(Assets) 0.018 0.027** 
 (0.70) (2.19) 
Turnover -0.021 -0.023 
 (-0.81) (-0.99) 
Tangibility 0.288*** 0.176* 
 (2.67) (1.81) 
Capex -0.886*** -0.996*** 
 (-3.31) (-3.70) 
MB -0.005 0.017 
 (-0.24) (1.10) 
Ln(MedAge) -0.007 -0.086 
 (-0.05) (-0.78) 
Educ -0.081 -0.168 
 (-0.31) (-0.73) 
Ln(Pop) 0.004 0.015 
 (0.31) (1.41) 
Married 0.576 0.559 
 (0.97) (1.05) 
SocialCap -0.005 0.007 
 (-0.32) (0.44) 
Constant -4.625*** -4.452*** 
 (-7.63) (-7.16) 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes No 
Estab. FE No Yes 
N 23,186 23,186 
Adj. R2 0.661 0.707 
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Table 8: Firm-level evidence on religiosity and employee treatment 
 
This table reports the relation between establishment employee weighted religiosity and employee 
treatment at the firm level. Panel A provides results on the employee weighted religiosity and 
employee-related misconduct. Employee-related misconduct includes labor laws violations and 
penalties. Violation is measured as the total number of employee-related violations per year, and 
penalty is measured as the natural logarithm of the total penalty amount due to labor laws violations 
per year. Panel B provides results on the effect of employee weighted religiosity on the health and 
safety index and workforce reduction. These are indicator variables obtained from the KLD 
database. The key independent variable is EmpWtRel, establishment-level employee-weighted 
religiosity. All other independent variables are defined in Appendix A. These firm-level analyses 
include three digits SIC coded industry fixed-effects. T-statistics are computed using standard 
errors corrected for clustering at the establishment-county level and reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Employee weighted religiosity and employee-related misconduct 
 (1) (2) 
Variable Violation Ln(penalty) 
   
EmpWtRel -0.984** -2.052** 
 (-2.35) (-2.37) 
Leverage -0.139 -0.407 
 (-0.51) (-1.02) 
Cashflow 0.398 -0.432 
 (0.96) (-0.39) 
Dividends -1.048 -5.481 
 (-0.60) (-1.35) 
Ln(Assets) -0.180 0.488** 
 (-1.55) (2.24) 
Turnover 0.065 0.070 
 (0.65) (0.46) 
Tangibility -0.057 1.172* 
 (-0.11) (1.74) 
Capex -1.751 -5.919*** 
 (-1.14) (-2.71) 
MB 0.041 0.045 
 (0.41) (0.33) 
Ln(Emp) 0.516*** 0.229 
 (3.53) (0.98) 
LabIntensity -0.018 0.049 
 (-0.78) (1.19) 
Constant 1.112 7.398*** 
 (1.34) (4.76) 
Year FE  Yes  Yes  
Industry FE Yes  Yes  
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N 1,942 1,942 
Adj. R2 0.396 0.435 
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Panel B: Employee weighted religiosity and safety index and workforce reduction 
 (1) (2) 
Variable Health and Safety Strength WorkforceReduction 
   
EmpWtRel 0.099** -0.199*** 
 (1.97) (-3.46) 
ROA 0.057 -0.286*** 
 (1.61) (-4.99) 
R&D 0.189** -0.070 
 (2.14) (-0.82) 
Adv 0.129 0.088 
 (0.66) (0.54) 
Ln(Emp) 0.030** -0.031*** 
 (2.08) (-2.75) 
SalesGrowth -0.004 -0.008** 
 (-0.93) (-2.07) 
Debt/Equity -0.030*** -0.001 
 (-2.77) (-0.05) 
Ln(Assets) -0.193*** 0.078** 
 (-4.90) (2.49) 
Ln(Assets)^2 0.016*** -0.002 
 (6.69) (-1.24) 
Turnover 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.02) (-0.11) 
RetVol 0.926* 2.061*** 
 (1.88) (3.14) 
Capex -0.410*** -0.329** 
 (-2.85) (-2.39) 
MB 0.012 0.008 
 (1.26) (1.04) 
Tangibility 0.122* -0.105** 
 (1.79) (-2.28) 
Constant 0.484*** -0.176 
 (2.83) (-1.33) 
Year FE     Yes   Yes   
Industry FE Yes   Yes   
N 4,488 4,252 
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Table 9: SGMM results: Workplace injuries and firm performance 
 
This table presents the results from the System GMM analysis for the effect of workplace injuries has 
on firm performance at the firm level, where the key independent variable is the natural logarithm of 
the total number of cases of employees’ death, and injuries and illnesses that result in days away from 
work or with job restriction or transfers, and other recordable cases at the firm in a given year. The 
dependent variable in Column (1) is MB measured as the market value of equities divided by the book 
value of equities. The dependent variable in Column (2) is Tobin’s Q. All other independent variables 
are defined in Appendix A. T-statistics are computed using standard errors corrected for clustering at 
the firm level and reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
Variable MB Tobin’s Q 
    
Ln (Num Cases) -0.026*** -0.164*** 
 (-3.65) (-2.77) 
Leverage -0.103 -0.049 
 (-1.16) (-0.31) 
Cashflow 1.470*** 0.464* 
 (9.00) (1.74) 
Ln(Assets) -0.025** 0.054* 
 (-2.46) (1.93) 
Sale_grwth 0.039*** 0.180*** 
 (8.14) (11.98) 
Dividends 7.808*** 8.729*** 
 (7.71) (6.98) 
Tangibility -0.935*** -0.820*** 
 (-10.60) (-4.76) 
Capex 3.477*** 3.176*** 
 (9.08) (6.22) 
Turnover -0.120*** 0.040 
 (-5.69) (0.80) 
Ln (Firm_age) -0.097*** -0.061** 
 (-4.85) (-2.04) 
Constant 1.801*** 1.850*** 
 (20.68) (14.70) 
Year FE   Yes Yes 
N 7,148 7,148 
No of Instruments 37 37 
AB(1) -8.12 -3.83 
p-value 0.000 0.000 
AB(2) -1.36 -0.10 
p-value 0.174 0.923 
Hansen  6.06 10.12 
p-value 0.417 0.122 
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Appendix A: Variable definition 
 
Variables Definitions  
Number of cases 
 
 
Sum of deaths and all injuries and illnesses that result in days away from 
work or with job restriction or transfers, and other recordable cases at the 
establishment in a given year (Column G + Column H + Column I + 
Column J of OSHA Form 300). 
Total case rate (TCR) 
 
The total number of cases in a given establishment year divided by the number 
of hours worked by all employees at the establishment in a given year and then 
multiplied by 200,000. 
DART 
 
The number of injuries and illnesses that result in days away from work 
or with job restriction or transfer, divided by the number of hours worked 
by all employees in a given establishment-year, and then multiplied by 
200,000. 
Daysawork Number of days away from work (column K). 
EstbEmp 
The average number of employees working in a given establishment 
during the year 
Ln(HoursEmp) 
The natural logarithm of the total number of annual hours worked in a 
given establishment dividend the number of employees 
Religiosity 
 
The number of religious adherents in a county divided by the county 
population in a year. Religiosity in the non-census year is determined by 
linear interpolation. Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox are particular 
religious followers. 
MedAge 
The median age of the establishment county population. Age in non-
census year determined by linear interpolation. 
Educ 
The fraction of the age 25+ establishment county population with at least 
one year of high school education. Education in non-census year 
determined by linear interpolation. 
Pop The total population in an establishment county.  
Married 
 
The fraction of county people who are currently married. Married in non-
census year determined by linear interpolation. 
Chinese_Pop A fraction of the county population consists of merely Chinese people. 
Mexican_Pop A fraction of the county population consists of merely Mexican people. 
Pol_Orient 
 
The ratio of votes for the Republic presidential candidate in a county to 
the sum of votes for both Republican and Democrat candidates. 
Leverage 
The sum of short-term and long-term debt scaled by the total asset. 
Compustat items: (dlc+ltt)/at 
Cashflow 
 
The sum of income before extraordinary items and depreciation and 
amortization scaled by the lagged asset. Compustat items: (ib+dp)/lagged 
at 
Dividends Common dividend scaled by the asset. Compustat items: dvc/at 
Ln (Assets) The natural logarithm of total assets. Compustat items: Ln(at) 
Turnover Total sales scaled by the total asset. Compustat items: sale/ lagged at 
Tangibility 
Net property, plant, and equipment scaled by the total asset. Compustat 
items: ppent/at 
Capex 
Capital expenditure scaled by lagged assets. Compustat items: 
Capx/lagged at 
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MB The market value of equities divided by the book value of equities. 
Tobin’s Q Tobin’s Q is measured using Compustat variables:(AT + ME - BE) / AT 
Sales growth Changes in sales scaled by lagged sales 
Social capital 
 
Social capital is the first principal component based on a principal 
component analysis (PCA) using Pvote, Respn, Ncss, and Assn from 
NRCRD data. 
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Appendix B: The first stage model regressing religiosity on county characteristics 
The table presents the results of estimates from an OLS regression to obtain a residual Religiosity. 
Definitions of variables are available in Appendix A.  
Variable Religiosity 
  
Ln (MedAge) -0.205*** 
 (-17.52) 




















Year FE  Yes 
N 26,290 
Adj. R2 0.258 
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Appendix C: Additional robustness 
 
This table presents the results from additional robustness check analyses. The key dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of the total number of cases that caused employees’ death, and 
injuries and illnesses that result in days away from work or with job restrictions or transfers, and 
other recordable cases at the establishment in a given year. In Panel A, we replicate our baseline 
analysis restricted to firms with multiple establishments only. The results reported in Columns (1) 
and (2) are from a restricted sample of firms having at least 3 establishments (which is equal to the 
median number of establishments). The results reported in Columns (3) and (4) are from a 
restricted sample of firms having at least 7 establishments (which is equal to the third quartile 
number of establishments). The results on alternative definitions of work-related injury and illness 
are reported in Panel B. Panel C reports results with respect to different fixed effects and clustering. 
Panel D represents the results from our baseline model after excluding the top five most and/or 
least religious states:  MS, UT, AL, LA, and AR. Panels E, F, and G provide results on controlling 
only decennial survey years by ARDA for religiosity, family firm, and short-interest (as in Bai et 
al. (2020). ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Restricted to multiple establishments  
 Ln (Num of cases) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Religiosity -0.133** -0.157*** -0.140** -0.154*** 
 (-2.49) (-3.06) (-2.57) (-3.01) 
     
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes No Yes No 
Estab. FE No Yes No Yes 
N 67,536 67,536 60,498 60,498 
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Panel B: Alternative definition of injury  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variable Injury only Ln (Daysawork) TCR DART 
         
Religiosity -0.124** -0.144*** -0.808*** -0.800*** -0.769* -0.776* -0.944*** -0.770** 
 (-2.39) (-2.86) (-4.89) (-4.88) (-1.77) (-1.90) (-2.86) (-2.43) 
         
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Constant -4.513*** -4.547*** -4.225*** -3.993*** 42.404*** 42.269*** 19.602*** 19.434*** 
 (-10.65) (-10.79) (-3.36) (-3.10) (11.82) (12.30) (6.76) (7.44) 
Year FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Estab. FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
N 72,287 72,287 72,287 72,287 72,287 72,287 72,287 72,287 
Adj. R2 0.657 0.706 0.423 0.478 0.354 0.440 0.341 0.421 
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Panel C: Different fixed effects  
 Ln (Num of cases) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Religiosity -0.134** -0.155*** -0.123** -0.147*** -0.130** -0.151** 
 (-2.44) (-2.90) (-2.35) (-2.88) (-2.34) (-2.58) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Year FE No No No No Yes Yes 
State*Year FE   Yes Yes No No No No 
Industry*Year FE No No Yes Yes No No 
Firm FE Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Establishment FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firm clustering No No No No Yes Yes 
N 72,287 72,287 72,287 72,287 72,287 72,287 
Adj. R2 0.662 0.710 0.670 0.716 0.664 0.711 
 
Panel D: Drop the most/least 5 religious states  
 Ln (Num of cases) 
Variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Religiosity -0.117** -0.137*** -0.119** -0.142*** -0.105* -0.127** 
 (-2.15) (-2.61) (-2.22) (-2.77) (-1.91) (-2.43) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Year FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Establishment FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Exclude Rel States Top 5 Most  Top 5 Least Both 
N 68,663 68,663 69,630 69,630 66,006 66,006 
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Panel E: Restricted to ARDA survey year (2010 and 2002 for 2000 survey year) 
 (1) (2) 
Variable Ln(Num of Cases) 
   
Religiosity -0.379*** -0.163* 
 (-3.81) (-1.89) 
   
Controls Yes  Yes 
   
Year 2010=1  -0.567*** 
  (-23.81) 
Constant 1.096* -4.408*** 
 (1.73) (-7.04) 
Year FE  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes No 
Estab. FE No Yes 
N 14,688 14,688 
Adj. R2 0.521 0.547 
 
Panel F: Controlling family firm 
 (1) (2) 
Variable Ln(Num of Cases) 
   
Religiosity -0.169** -0.160** 
 (-2.12) (-2.21) 
   
Controls Yes Yes 
Family Firm 0.00026 0.174 
  (1.46) 
Constant -6.641*** -7.040*** 
 (-8.07) (-9.72) 
Year FE  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes No 
Estab. FE No Yes 
N 17552 17552 






26 Family firm coefficient drops because it correlates with firm fixed effects. 
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Panel G: Controlling short interest 
 (1) (2) 
Variable Ln(Num of Cases) 
Religiosity -0.137*** -0.161*** 
 (-2.60) (-3.17) 
   
Controls Yes Yes 
   
Ln(menshortint) -0.005 -0.002 
 (-1.06) (-0.52) 
Constant -4.239*** -4.425*** 
 (-9.97) (-10.65) 
Year FE  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes No 
Estab. FE No Yes 
N 69,608 69,608 
Adj. R2 0.665 0.713 
 
 
Panel H: Only financial crisis period (2007-2009) 
 (1) (2) 
Variable Ln(Num of Cases) 
   
Religiosity -0.125* -0.203*** 
 (-1.92) (-3.05) 
   
Controls Yes Yes 
   
Constant -4.078*** -4.383*** 
 (-5.25) (-7.30) 
Year FE  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes No 
Estab. FE No Yes 
N 21,947 21,947 
Adj. R2 0.662 0.713 
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Figure 1: Observations by year 
This figure shows the number of observations over the sample year. Our sample period begins in 2002 and ends in 
2010. 
 
Figure 2: Injury by year 
This figure shows the average number of cases and days away from work, TCR, or with job restriction or transfer 
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Figure 3: Injury after migration shock 
This figure shows the average workplace injury and illness for both treatment and control firms during the pre- and 
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